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Dr. Marcus Moore*

The Flaws of Magic Bullet Theory:
Retraining Unconscionability to
Discretely Target Different Contexts of
Unfairness in Contracts

Unconscionability has long been a troublesome area in Canadian jurisprudence.
This is of significant concern given unconscionability’s pre-eminence as a protection
of contractual fairness. This article elaborates a much-needed reorganization and
rationalization of unconscionability in Canada. Under current law, a single doctrine
hopelessly targets two divergent purposes. I set out here a proposed redevelopment
rather of separate common law doctrines, each fit-for-purpose: (1) An English-style
unconscionable bargains doctrine for avoiding bargains that exploited disability,
and (2) an American-style unconscionable clauses doctrine to control unfair terms
in standard form contracts. Extensive Canadian precedent supports this solution,
assuring its feasibility and legitimacy. To manage the doctrines’ coexistence and
clarify this universally confounding area of law, I recommend further a distinctly
Canadian approach: Recognizing unconscionability as an “organizing principle”.
Alongside that of good faith which governs performance, this one would address
enforceability in abuse of power situations, elevating fairness in Canadian contract
law.

L’iniquité a longtemps été un domaine problématique dans la jurisprudence
canadienne. Ceci est un enjeu important étant donné la prééminence du concept
de l’iniquité comme protection juridique de l’équité contractuelle. Cet article élabore
une réorganisation et une rationalisation nécessaire de l’iniquité au Canada. En
vertu du droit actuel, une seule doctrine vise vainement deux objectifs divergents.
J’expose ici une proposition de redéveloppement : à la place de cette approche
futile, on devrait déployer deux doctrines de common law distinctes, chacune
adaptée à son objectif unique : (1) une doctrine de négociation inique à l’anglaise
pour éviter les transactions qui exploitent une faiblesse particulière, et (2) une
doctrine des clauses iniques à l’américaine pour contrôler les clauses abusive
dans les contrats d’adhésion. De nombreux précédents canadiens soutiennent
cette solution, assurant sa faisabilité et sa légitimité. Pour gérer la coexistence des
doctrines et clarifier ce domaine du droit universellement déroutant, je suggère une
approche typiquement canadienne : reconnaître l’iniquité comme un « principe ».
Parallèlement à celui de la bonne foi qui régit l’exécution contractuelle, celui-ci
traiterait de la force exécutoire dans les situations d’abus de pouvoir, augmentant
l’équité dans le droit des contrats au Canada.
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Introduction
Unconscionability has been a troublesome area in Canadian jurisprudence
for at least 30 years, and according to some writers, for its entire 150-year
history. That trouble is of great significance in that in the eyes of some,
such as Peter Benson, unconscionability is “the paradigm of contractual
fairness.”1 Currently, the state of the law in Canada is that a single doctrine
is expected to cover functions elsewhere served by different doctrines.
Stretched by the effort to combine these, the features of unconscionability
in Canada are insufficiently tailored to either, seriously limiting its
1.

Peter Benson, Justice in Transactions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2019) at 167.
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functionality. This article investigates this predicament and proposes a
solution that is novel but supported by strong Canadian precedent.
The law in Canada has been influenced by two distinct types of
common law doctrine sharing the title “unconscionability.” The first
of these derives from England. Its purpose is to allow the avoidance
of transactions in which a party under a special disability was taken
advantage of in the bargaining process. The other originated in America.
Its primary function is to control unfair terms in standard form contracts.
Each of these distinct unconscionability doctrines has its own features,
which are aligned with the doctrines’ respective purposes, so that both are
reasonably fit-for-purpose.
Influenced by the unconscionability doctrines from England and
America, unconscionability in Canada tries to pursue both purposes with a
single doctrine. Reflecting this dual purpose, the doctrine is characterized
by features that either try to span or split the difference between contrasting
positions embodied in the English and American doctrines. Some of these
features govern key matters, such as the doctrine’s scope and effects, and
the import of unconscientiousness.
In this article, I demonstrate the flaws of this “magic bullet” approach2:
rather than empowering a single doctrine to hit both targets, these
intermediate and/or bridging features instead leave unconscionability
unsuited to serve either purpose well. I then demonstrate how this unfitness
flows directly from the idea of having a single doctrine perform these two
differing functions. As a result, the prospects of refining the doctrine to
enable it to achieve its double-aim would seem dim. Of note, in England
and America where a doctrine of “unconscionability” serves one or the
other function, but not both, separate legal devices exist to deal with the
other function.
To ameliorate the fitness-for-purpose of unconscionability in Canada,
I suggest a similar differentiation: Canada should employ separate
doctrines, each dedicated to only one of the contemplated purposes. An
unconscionable bargains doctrine of the type of the English doctrine would
assure Canadian common law has a device fit for avoiding transactions
where a party’s disability was exploited in the bargaining process. An
unconscionable clauses doctrine similar to the American doctrine would
provide Canadian law a tool properly tailored to control of unfair terms in
2.
The term “magic bullet” is “used to describe a universal solution a person uses for any problem
they encounter: “Urban Dictionary: magic bullet” (17 May 2005), online: Urban Dictionary <www.
urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=magic%20bullet> [perma.cc/HW72-EZP4]. Some Ivory
Tower dictionaries confuse this popular expression with a different expression, “silver bullet,” which
refers rather to a quick solution to a difficult problem.
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standard form contracts.3 Due to the longstanding influence of the English
and American doctrines on unconscionability in Canada, a wealth of
Canadian precedent already exists to support this solution, thus ensuring
its feasibility and legitimacy.
To rationalize the coexistence of distinct unconscionability doctrines in
Canada, explain the broad concept overarching both, and better illuminate
this long troublesome area of law more generally, I further recommend
recognizing unconscionability as a general organizing principle (not an
all-purpose doctrine) in Canadian contract law. The latter step has been
advocated by Stephen Waddams for a half-century and would dovetail
with the Supreme Court of Canada’s prior recognition of an organizing
principle of good faith in contractual performance—which likewise
contains distinct doctrines for differing situations. As with good faith, this
organizing principle would relate to and strengthen fairness in contract
law. The organizing principle of unconscionability would be distinguished
from that of good faith by its focus on potential relief from contractual
enforcement in situations of unconscientious abuse of power—subject to
the specific conditions of the applicable subordinate doctrines.
These steps would assure the fitness-for-purpose of unconscionability
in Canada, drawing on established doctrines long in use, and fostering
harmonization to remove impediments to cross-border trade. Yet, the
doctrines would be organized inside a clear and rational framework that is
distinctively Canadian.
The paper’s discussion starts, below, by looking at the English and
American unconscionability doctrines which have influenced the Canadian
doctrine, before turning to the current state of the law in Canada. After
demonstrating the deficiencies of the current “magic bullet” approach,
I discuss the preferability of using separate doctrines for avoiding
transactions in which a party’s disability was exploited and for controlling
offensive standard form terms. I then develop the specific three-part
solution proposed above to revitalize this area of law, building on a suite
of important precedents in Canadian contract law.
I. Two influential types of “unconscionability” doctrine
As mentioned in the introduction, two distinct types of common law
doctrine titled “unconscionability” have been influential in Canadian
law: one originating in England, and one in America. Each type pursues
a different purpose, and each type has different features, aligned with its
3.
Throughout, I use the phrase “standard form contract” in its narrow/specific sense (aka “contract
of adhesion”). “Standard form contract” is sometimes used, in other writings, to refer to a broader
array of standardized contracts.

The Flaws of Magic Bullet Theory: Retraining Unconscionability
to Discretely Target Different Contexts of Unfairness in Contracts

555

corresponding purpose. I survey these two types of unconscionability
doctrine below, starting with the English doctrine, before turning to the
American.
1. The English doctrine of unconscionability
The English doctrine of unconscionability serves the purpose of enabling
the setting aside of unfair bargains in unusual circumstances in which one
party suffered from a special disability that its counterpart took advantage
of in the bargaining process.4
The formulation of the doctrine reflects this purpose. There is some
variation in how its requirements have been cast.5 As well, orthodox
articulations can be misleading if read literally; and thus in conveying
the doctrine’s requirements, modern writers often add considerable
clarification and explanation.6 Factoring these into presentation of the
doctrine’s elements, they can be restated more directly as: (1) one party
was impaired in the bargaining process by a special disability such as
poverty, ignorance, illiteracy, age, mental infirmity, or necessity;7 (2) its
counterpart knew or ought to have known in the making of the contract
of the other party’s impairment;8 and (3) the substance of the resulting
contract is markedly unfair, suggesting that advantage was taken of the
impairment.9 In that case, unless the advantaged party disproves that
4.
See e.g. Rick Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004)
[Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts]; John Cartwright, Unequal Bargaining: A Study of Vitiating
Factors in the Formation of Contracts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) at 214-220; Marcus Moore,
“Why Does Lord Denning’s Lead Balloon Intrigue Us Still? The Prospects of Finding a Unifying
Principle for Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionability” (2018) 134 Law Q Rev 257 at 273-278
[Moore, “Denning’s Lead Ballon”], online: <works.bepress.com/marcus-moore/3/> [perma.cc/VD48JNG8]; Treitel on The Law of Contract, 14th ed by Edwin Peel (London, UK: Sweet & Maxwell,
2015) at para 10-043.
5.
Compare e.g. Jack Beatson, Andrew Burrows & John Cartwright, Anson’s Law of Contract,
31st ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020) at 398; Mindy Chen-Wishart, Contract Law, 6th ed
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018) at 361.
6.
See e.g. Chen-Wishart, supra note 5 at 362-365; Beatson, Burrows & Cartwright, supra note 5
at 398.
7.
Stephen A Smith, Contract Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) at 343-344;
Peel, supra note 4 at para 10-043; Rick Bigwood, “Antipodean Reflections on the Canadian
Unconscionability Doctrine” (2005) 84:2 Can Bar Rev 171 at 182-187 [Bigwood, “Antipodean
Reflections”]; Earl of Aylesford v Morris, [1873] LR 8 Ch App 484 at 491 (Ch (Eng)), Lord Selborne
LC [Aylesford].
8.
Hart v O’Connor, [1985] UKPC 17; Earl of Chesterfield v Janssen, [1750] 2 Ves Sen
125 at para 155, 28 ER 82 (ChD (Eng)) [Chesterfield]; Ayres v Hazelgrove (9 February 1984),
unreported (QBD (Eng)); Moore, “Denning’s Lead Balloon,” supra note 4 at 273-278; Charles
Rickett, “Unconscionability and Commercial Law” (2005) 24:1 UQLJ 73 at 78, online: <ssrn.com/
abstract=2356050> [perma.cc/2LY2-YWGN].
9.
Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil (GB) Ltd, [1983] 1 WLR 87 at 95, [1983] 1 ER 944 (ChD
(Eng)) [Alec Lobb (HC)]; Fry v Lane, [1888] 40 Ch D 312 at 322 (ChD (Eng)); Bigwood, Exploitative
Contracts, supra note 4, 4.3.1-4.3.2; Smith, supra note 7 at 342; Moore, “Denning’s Lead Balloon,”
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presumption of advantage-taking (for example by showing that the
disabled party received legal advice that made up for its impairment, or
intended a partial gift), the contract is voidable.10
The doctrine’s conceptual foundation also mirrors its purpose of
enabling relief from unfair bargains resulting from exploitation of a
counterpart’s special disability. The doctrine is conceived of as a defect in
contract formation: the consent of the disabled party is vitiated, as it was
tainted by impairment of the party’s decisional autonomy, and exploitation
of that by its counterpart.11 This explains the doctrine’s effect of avoiding
a transaction that was unconscionable.
The doctrine’s justification also accords with its purpose of relieving
unfair bargains taking advantage of a counterpart’s disability: the
“unconscientious use of power” by a stronger party against a weaker
offends equity’s concern with conscience.12
As just explained, the various features of the English doctrine,
including its elements, operation, conception, and justification are all
aligned with its purpose, thus ensuring that it is fit-for-purpose.
2. The American doctrine of unconscionability
Sharing the title “unconscionability,” but comprising a different type of
doctrine with a different purpose than the English doctrine, is the American
doctrine.13 A central purpose animating the development of the American
doctrine was control of unfair terms in standard form contracts.14 While
it is also capable of applying where one party lacked meaningful choice
over the terms for a reason other than their being imposed by standard
form, courts tend to be “chary” about finding that the facts establish that
the doctrine’s procedural condition of lack of choice.15 Control of unfair
standard form terms is the doctrine’s principal function in practice.16
supra note 4 at 261; Chen-Wishart, supra note 5 at 361.
10. Beatson, Burrows & Cartwright, supra note 5 at 399; Chen-Wishart, supra note 5 at 364-365;
SM Waddams,The Law of Contracts, 7th ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada, 2017) at para 552
[Waddams, Law of Contracts].
11. Bigwood, “Antipodean Reflections,” supra note 7 at 211-214; Cartwright, supra note 4 at 214220; Chen-Wishart, supra note 5 at 204.
12. Aylesford, supra note 7 at 489-491; Chesterfield, supra note 8; Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts,
supra note 4.
13. David Capper, “The Unconscionable Bargain in the Common Law World” (2010) 126 Law Q
Rev 403; Moore, “Denning’s Lead Balloon,” supra note 4 at 262.
14. Karl N Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (Boston: Little Brown, 1960)
at 369; American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law: Consumer Contracts: Tentative Draft (18
April 2019), online (pdf): ALI <www.ali.org/media/filer_public/05/30/053007a1-2b37-4142-b9c37a881e847d50/consumer_contracts_-_td_-_online.pdf> [perma.cc/XU3V-LAE7] [ALI, Consumer
Contracts]; E Allan Farnsworth, Contracts, 4th ed (New York: Aspen, 2004), § 4.26-4.28.
15. Farnsworth, supra note 14 at 287, 303-304.
16. Ibid, § 4.26-4.28; ALI, Consumer Contracts, supra note 14, § 5. With the rise of the consumer
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The features of the American unconscionability doctrine reflect this
purpose. It applies to the terms of standard form contracts as a result of
the form-recipient’s “absence of meaningful choice” over the terms arising
from the imposition that characterizes the form contracting process.17 It
inquires into whether the drafter included among these imposed standard
form terms some specific clause that is markedly unfair. If so, the court
declines enforcement of that clause while typically leaving the rest of the
contract in force.18
The conceptual foundation of the American doctrine accords with this
function of controlling unfair standard form terms. Drawing on inspiration
from Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) § 2-302, which governs sale of
goods, the courts developed “either by analogy or as an expression of a
general doctrine” for contracts of any subject-matter a mechanism that
“directly” and “explicitly” authorizes judicial control of unfair standard
form terms.19 This alleviated the problem of judges previously having to
“covertly” rely on strained applications of procedures such as interpretation,
implication, and incorporation in order to effectively control the fairness
of standard form terms. As Karl Llewellyn argued, the covert approach
was problematic both in offering inadequate control and in discrediting
normal use of those procedures.20
The justification for the American doctrine also accords with this
function of controlling unfair terms in standard form contracts: “[t]he
principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise.”21
These phrases that the principle invokes are used in discussions of
standard form contracting to describe when a form-drafter abuses its
power to impose terms by including harsh or surprising clauses within the
unnegotiated form.

economy, it is also said that consumer contracts are a concern of the doctrine; but consumer contracts
are themselves overwhelmingly in standard form: AT&T Mobility LLC v Concepcion, 563 US 333
(2011) (“the times in which consumer contracts were anything other than adhesive are long past” at
346-347).
17. Williams v Walker-Thomas Furniture, 350 F (2d) 445 at 449 (DC Cir 1965) [Williams];
Farnsworth, supra note 14, § 4.28 at 301.
18. While “the court, in its discretion, may refuse to enforce the contract as a whole if it is permeated
by the unconscionability” of the clause (see Uniform Commercial Code § 2-302 Official Comment 2
(2002) [UCC]), “courts have usually confined their attention to unconscionable clauses themselves”:
Farnsworth, supra note 14, § 4.28 at 306.
19. Farnsworth, supra note 14, § 4.28 at 298-299; UCC, supra note 18, § 2-302 Official Comment
1; Llewellyn, supra note 14 (“these provisions may lead appellate courts into a machinery for striking
down where striking down is needed” at 369).
20. Llewellyn, supra note 14 at 364-365; UCC, supra note 18, § 2-302 Official Comment 1.
21. UCC, supra note 18, § 2-302 Official Comment 1.
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The American doctrine’s significant differences from the English
doctrine reflect its differing purpose. Meanwhile, as just explained, the
American doctrine’s various features, including its elements, operation,
conception, and justification align with its own purpose, assuring that it is
fit for its proper distinct purpose.
Unconscionability in Canada has been strongly influenced by both the
English unconscionability doctrine and the American unconscionability
doctrine. The next section looks at the current state of the law on
unconscionability in Canada.
II. Current state of the law on unconscionability in Canada
The current state of the law on unconscionability in Canada derives
from the Supreme Court of Canada’s leading precedent, Uber v Heller.22
The formulation of unconscionability established by that case was not a
consensus view: two justices well-versed in private law disagreed with
it sharply.23 However, the current state of the law is established by the
majority judgment.24 In order to distinguish that formulation from preceding
formulations of unconscionability in Canada (discussed later in this paper)
prevailing prior to the reconstruction of unconscionability in Canada in
the Uber case, I will refer to the doctrine representing the current state of
the law as the Uber unconscionability doctrine. As I summarize below,
Canada’s Uber doctrine, both in its purposes and in its doctrinal features,
reveals strong influences of the English doctrine as well as the American
doctrine.
1. Dual purpose
Canada’s Uber unconscionability doctrine strives to cover under one
doctrinal roof the different purposes of both the English and American
unconscionability doctrines.
Starting with the English doctrine, its purpose of allowing for the
setting aside of unfair contracts in which a party suffering from a special
disability was taken advantage of in the bargaining process is clearly among
the purposes of Canada’s Uber unconscionability doctrine. On this, there
is said to be scholarly consensus that unconscionability in Canada covers
22. Uber Technologies Inc v Heller, 2020 SCC 16 [Uber]. For a general summary of the case, see
Mitchell McInnes, “Uber and Unconscionability in the Supreme Court of Canada” (2021) 137 Law Q
Rev 30.
23. Brown J (concurring) and Cote J (dissenting). Certain aspects of Brown J’s discussion are
relevant to the solution proposed here, and will be discussed later.
24. Authored by Abella and Rowe JJ. Discussion in this paper of its present location being
somewhere in between the English and American doctrines builds on Marcus Moore, “The HMCS
Unconscionability: adrift in the Atlantic” (2021) 21:2 Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal
336.
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situations in which there is “some weakness or vulnerability affecting the
claimant” such that they “cannot adequately protect their interests in the
contracting process.”25 As a result:
weaker parties may be vulnerable to exploitation in the contracting
process. Regardless of the type of impairment involved, what matters is
the presence of a bargaining context “where the law’s normal assumptions
about free bargaining either no longer hold substantially true or are
incapable of being fairly applied.” In these circumstances, courts can
provide relief from a bargain that is improvident for the weaker party in
the contracting relationship.26

As these statements demonstrate, Canada’s Uber unconscionability
doctrine certainly encompasses the purpose of the English doctrine. But
as the statements reveal, the Uber doctrine envisions coverage extending
beyond special disabilities (poverty, ignorance, illiteracy, age, mental
infirmity, necessity, etc.)27 to circumstances characterized by the existence
of relative bargaining strength and weakness in general: “any contract
with…inequality of bargaining power”; “[t]here are no ‘rigid limitations’
on the types of inequality that fit this description.”28
Turning to the purpose of the American doctrine in controlling unfair
terms in standard form contracts, Canada’s Uber unconscionability
doctrine aspires to fulfil this function also.29 The intent to apply the
Uber doctrine of “unconscionability in connection with standard form
contracts” is described as a “modern application” of unconscionability
to circumstances where consent, “the normative rationale for contract
enforcement…[is] stretched beyond the breaking point.”30 In explaining
the Uber doctrine’s intention of controlling unfair standard form terms,
the SCC majority expressly noted that this has been done “in American
jurisprudence for more than half a century,” and cited the leading case
of the American doctrine of unconscionability.31 The SCC majority also
invoked the inspiration behind the American doctrine: the UCC and
scholarly writing about control of standard form terms by Karl Llewellyn,
the “primary drafter” of the section on unconscionability (§ 2-302).32

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Uber, supra note 22 at paras 62, 66.
Ibid at para 72 [references omitted].
See supra note 7.
Uber, supra note 22 at paras 54, 67 [references omitted].
Ibid at paras 87-91.
Ibid at para 90.
Ibid.
Ibid at para 87.
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As these references from current Canadian authority show, the Uber
doctrine of unconscionability shares the American doctrine’s aim of
controlling unfair terms in standard form contracts. But the references
also signal that whereas the American doctrine (as mentioned) sees
this unfairness as in the drafter’s abuse of its power to impose terms by
including an offensive clause, Canada’s Uber doctrine sees the unfairness
as in the form-recipient having to consent without being duly informed of
the content and import of the clause.
The Uber unconscionability doctrine sums up its combined purpose
of: (1) setting aside bargains made through exploitation of disability; and
(2) controlling unfair terms in standard form contracts, by observing: “in
many cases where [unconscionability] has been demonstrated, the relevant
disadvantages impaired a party’s ability to freely enter or negotiate
a contract” (per 1), “compromised a party’s ability to understand or
appreciate the meaning and significance of the contractual terms” (per 2),
“or both.”33
2. Doctrinal features
Reflecting its attempt to combine these dual purposes, the Uber
unconscionability doctrine displays features which try to span or split
the difference between contrasting positions embodied in the English and
American unconscionability doctrines. Below, I illustrate this through three
examples representing key matters: the doctrine’s scope of application;
whether it includes a requirement of unconscientiousness on the part of
the defendant of the unconscionability claim; and the proportion of the
contract at stake.
a. Scope of application
The scope of application of the Uber unconscionability doctrine falls
between those of the English and American doctrines. Thus, as alluded to
above, the Uber doctrine encompasses the English doctrine’s application
to circumstances of special disability (poverty, ignorance, illiteracy, age,
mental infirmity, necessity, etc.) but extends further to a generalized
circumstance of “inequality of bargaining power,” regardless of cause, and
including stemming from common sources such as “differences in wealth,
knowledge, or experience.”34 Application to generalized circumstances
is a feature the Uber doctrine shares with the American doctrine, which
applies to a pervasive phenomenon, standard form contracting. Indeed,
standard form contracts are expressly covered by the Uber doctrine, unlike
33.
34.

Ibid at para 68.
Ibid at paras 67-72.
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the English doctrine.35 However, due to the Uber doctrine’s differing
identification of the source of unfairness in standard form terms (as noted
above), its application to such terms is restricted to where the formrecipient is not informed about them. The Uber doctrine does not apply
if a standard form “clearly and effectively communicate[s] the meaning
of clauses with unusual or onerous effects.”36 By contrast, the American
doctrine still would apply because of the form-recipient’s “absence of
meaningful choice” over standard form terms: that is, regardless of a formrecipient’s information, in “a form contract the terms…are not subject to
negotiation.”37 In short, the Uber unconscionability doctrine tries to bridge
the scope covered by the English and American doctrines—extending the
former, and limiting the latter, to cover any circumstance of consent that is
not free and informed.38
b. Requirement of unconscientiousness
Another key feature illustrating how the Uber unconscionability doctrine
tries to negotiate a compromise position between those of the English and
American doctrines is in omitting an unconscientiousness requirement.
As noted earlier, the wrongfulness that makes for “unconscionability”
is unconscientious abuse of power, in the sense of knowingly taking
advantage of a counterpart’s inability to protect itself in the contracting
process. This is a required element of the English doctrine, which grants
the disabled party relief only if the other party (actually or constructively)
knew of its impairment.39 The Uber doctrine rejects such a requirement—a
surprising position.40 It must do so in order to also cover standard
form terms, because of its thesis that what makes these unfair is if the
form-recipient’s consent to them was not informed. In the making of a
standard form contract “the parties [do] not interact or negotiate,” and
so the drafting party is ignorant of the form-recipient’s information.41
The American doctrine also omits such a requirement, but only because
it would be superfluous. As mentioned above, the American doctrine
35. Ibid at paras 87-91.
36. Ibid at para 88 (it similarly does not apply if the recipient has prior familiarity with the form or
receives explanations or advice).
37. Williams, supra note 17 at 449; ALI, Consumer Contracts, supra note 14 at 7; American Law
Institute, Restatement (Second) of the Law of Contracts §§ 211(2), 208 (1981) [ALI, Restatement
(Second)]; Carnival Cruise Lines Inc v Shute, 499 US 585 at 593 (1991) [Carnival Cruise].
38. See text to supra note 33.
39. See supra note 8.
40. Uber, supra note 22 at paras 84-85. For more on this surprising position, see Marcus Moore,
“The Doctrine of Contractual Absolution” (2022) 59:4 Alberta Law Review 871 [Moore, “Contractual
Absolution”].
41. Ibid at para 85.
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perceives the unfairness in standard form contracting as where a drafter
abuses the characteristic lack of meaningful choice over the terms of the
form-recipient in this mode of contracting by knowingly including an
offensive term.42 The unconscientiousness element of unconscionability
that is distinctly required by the English doctrine is therefore omitted from
the Uber doctrine as by the American doctrine; but in the Uber doctrine,
it is not meanwhile already incorporated implicitly as in the American
doctrine via the latter’s position regarding what makes unfair terms unfair.
c. Proportion of contract at stake
The Uber doctrine also tries to straddle the positions of the English and
American doctrines of unconscionability with respect to the proportion of a
contract at stake. Under the Uber doctrine, “a finding of unconscionability
can be directed at a contract as a whole or against any severable provisions
of it.”43 By contrast, the English doctrine’s inquiry into substantive
fairness is of the bargain as a whole. And if consent to the bargain was
tainted by unconscionability, the doctrine’s effect is to avoid the bargain
as a whole. It does not apply to individual terms. Meanwhile, the focus
of the American doctrine, with its purpose of controlling standard form
terms, is on individual clauses. The term-specific effect is not subject
to a severability proviso, as under the Uber doctrine. Instead, under the
American doctrine, the reasonable expectations of the parties arising from
the basic terms actually negotiated supply a baseline against which form
terms can be judged, so that if an unfair term is not enforced, an implied
term based on the parties’ reasonable expectations can prevent the contract
from being incomplete.44 Here again, the Uber doctrine therefore occupies
an intermediate position between those of the English and American
unconscionability doctrines.
Next, I assess whether the Uber unconscionability doctrine’s just
described blending of the features of the English and American doctrines
suit it to pursuing the dual purposes of those doctrines, as it aspires to do.

42. See supra note 17.
43. Uber, supra note 22, n 8.
44. ALI, Restatement (Second), supra note 37, § 211(3); Llewellyn, supra note 14 at 370-371;
W David Slawson, “The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of Contracts Law by
Standard Forms” (1984) 46:1 U Pitt L Rev 52-53; Todd Rakoff, “Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in
Reconstruction” (1983) 96:6 Harv L Rev 1173 at 1258, DOI: <10.2307/1341009>.
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III. Appraisal of existing law on unconscionability in Canada
1. Fitness-for-purposes?
In this section, I argue that rather than arming the Uber doctrine to
realize its ambition of killing two birds with one stone, its intermediate or
combination design leaves the doctrine unsuited to either purpose. This is
demonstrated using the same features from the last section as examples.
Along the way, I further show how these key features’ unfitness-for-purpose
flows directly from the ambition of a single “uber”-doctrine performing the
different functions of the two distinct doctrines it aspires to transcend.
a. Scope of application
The English doctrine’s limitation to situations of special disability
(poverty, ignorance, illiteracy, age, mental infirmity, necessity, etc.)
keeps the doctrine exceptional. Confined to aberrant circumstances,
based on particular facts, it can achieve the purpose of granting relief
from bargains defectively formed because of consent that was tainted by
impairment and exploitation, without generally undermining stability of
contract.45 By contrast, the Uber unconscionability doctrine’s generalized
requirement of inequality of bargaining power may be satisfied in a
wide array of circumstances, including common ones, as reflected in the
reference to “differences in wealth, knowledge, or experience” as well
as the invocation of even broader possible circumstances through the
additional provision that “inequality encompasses more than just those
attributes.”46 Courts have observed, for instance, that “[a]ny individual
wanting to borrow money from a bank…or other financial institution
in order to pay his liabilities or buy some property he urgently wants to
acquire will have virtually no bargaining power.”47 Some courts have even
suggested that most contracts are made under conditions of inequality of
bargaining power.48 Whether or not that is so, the vast swath of contracts
subject to scrutiny and potential rescission under the Uber doctrine of
unconscionability makes it unworkable. Applying it on that scale would be
immensely destructive of stability of contract, upon which a great deal of
broader economic planning depends. As a result, the Uber doctrine must
45. Marcus Moore, Regulating Boilerplate: Resolving the Problems of Imposition and Unfairness
in Standard Form Contracts (London, UK: Bloomsbury, forthcoming 2023) at 56 [Moore, Regulating
Boilerplate].
46. Uber, supra note 22 at para 67. Special disabilities are not required, they merely “assist in
organizing and understanding prior cases of unconscionability”: Uber, at para 72.
47. Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd & Ors v Total Oil (GB) Ltd (1984), [1985] 1 WLR 173 at 183, [1984]
EWCA Civ 2 [Alec Lobb (CA)].
48. Ibid; Floyd v Couture, 2004 ABQB 238 at para 146.
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necessarily be applied sparingly in practice, despite the liberality of its
articulated scope. The cases in which unconscionability’s application is
held back are then quite arbitrary, unlike under the English doctrine whose
scope-defining principle of special disability is limited enough that it can
be adhered to in practice. For these reasons, the Uber doctrine is more of
a “wildcard” than a doctrine that can be counted on to relieve any specific
set (wide or narrow) of exploitive bargains.49
Seeking to use a single magic bullet doctrine to achieve not just the
purpose of the English doctrine of unconscionability, but also the American
doctrine’s different purpose of controlling standard form terms, forces the
hand of the Uber doctrine on this question of its scope of application:
standard form contracting is a general—indeed ubiquitous—source of
vulnerability in the contracting process. Whereas the English “doctrine
finds its staple only with the disadvantaged who are indeed ‘special.’ All
members of modern Western society are vulnerable in a general way to
the standardized contract.”50 To cover this, the Uber doctrine needs a
scope-defining principle that is general and covers common situations; to
confine itself to special situations that occur exceptionally, like the English
doctrine, would exclude standard form contracting. The principle in fact
chosen to define the scope of the Uber doctrine—inequality of bargaining
power—is one that because of its breadth and generality had been invoked
in connection with both the English and American doctrines. Notably, an
actual doctrine of inequality of bargaining power was earlier rejected by
high courts as too broad and routine a circumstance to respect stability of
contract.51
Meanwhile, the prescribed scope of the Uber doctrine is also not
well-suited to controlling unfair terms in standard form contracts, as it
aims to do in encompassing that purpose of the American doctrine. The
Uber doctrine’s inapplicability in cases where the standard form-recipient
is informed regarding the terms limits its usefulness for that purpose.
For instance, the fact it does not apply where the contract “clearly and
effectively communicate[s] the meaning of clauses with unusual or
onerous effects” prevents the doctrine from going much further than “red
hand”-type rules under the law of incorporation.52 Information-based
49. The “wildcard” metaphor is borrowed from Margaret Radin, Boilerplate: The Fine Print,
Vanishing Rights, and the Rule of Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).
50. Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts, supra note 4 at 276.
51. Pao On v Lau Yiu Long (1979), [1980] AC 614 at 634, [1979] UKPC 17 [Pao On]; National
Westminster Bank Plc v Morgan, [1985] 1 AC 686 at 708, [1985] UKHL 2 [Morgan].
52. Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking, [1970] EWCA Civ 2; Tilden Rent-a-Car Co v Clendenning
(1978), 83 DLR (3d) 400, 18 OR (2d) 601 (ONCA).
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strategies more generally have been repeatedly tried and resoundingly
proven not to significantly alter form-recipients’ decisions regarding
standard form contracts.53 This is because form-recipients do not share the
Uber doctrine’s assumption that limiting information and negotiation are a
problem; they see it as a savings in transaction costs that they benefit from
when they engage in standard form contracting, and which they need in
modern society where contracting is a constant feature of daily life.54 The
American doctrine does not fixate on the form-recipient’s information.
Forms are dealt with “treating alike all [recipients]…without regard to their
knowledge or understanding of the standard terms.”55 As the American
Law Institute Restatement of Consumer Contracts strongly emphasizes,
the American doctrine recognizes that the real problem is a form-drafter’s
abuse of its ability to impose terms in standard form contracting by
inserting an unfair term.56 Thus, for controls of standard form terms to be
effective, they must apply whether or not the form-recipient is informed
about the terms—as they do under the American doctrine, but not the Uber
doctrine.
In this regard, the Uber doctrine is doomed by its goal of covering
under one roof bargained contracts (as in the English doctrine) and standard
form contracts (as in the American doctrine): it must uphold as essential
the weaker party’s true consent to the terms of a bargain in order to cover
scenarios typical of the English doctrine, where relief from enforcement is
available because the consent was tainted by impairment and exploitation.
As a consequence, it cannot at the same time treat the weaker party’s
consent to terms as nonexistent and unnecessary, as the American doctrine
does in accepting that form terms are made without meaningful choice
by the form-recipient,57 and thus concerning itself only with whether the
terms are substantively unreasonable. In the face of this predicament, the
Uber unconscionability doctrine bases its case on classical contract theory,
in which consent is the lynchpin.58 From there, the doctrine can only try
again the hopeless strategy of solving the unfairness in standard form
53. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E Schneider, More Than You Wanted to Know: The Failure of
Mandated Disclosure (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014) ch 2 at 14-32; Yannis Bakos,
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R Trossen, “Does Anyone Read the Fine Print?: Consumer
Attention to Standard-Form Contracts” (2014) 43:1 J Leg Stud 1, DOI: <10.1086/674424>; ALI,
Consumer Contracts, supra note 14 at 35.
54. Moore, supra note 45 at 9; Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999) at 3; RH Coase, “The Nature of the Firm” (1937) 4:16 Economica 386, DOI: <10.1111/
j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x>.
55. ALI, Restatement (Second), supra note 37, § 211(2).
56. ALI, Consumer Contracts, supra note 14 at 4-5; on the broader point, see supra note 37.
57. Llewellyn, supra note 14 at 370; ALI, Consumer Contracts, supra note 14.
58. Uber, supra note 22 at paras 55-59.
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contracts through consent that is better-informed59: “unconscionability
has a meaningful role to play in examining the conditions behind consent
to contracts of adhesion, as it does with any contract”; “Applying the
unconscionability doctrine to standard form contracts…encourages those
drafting such contracts to make them more accessible to the other party.”60
Besides this approach’s futility in controlling unfair standard form terms,
it is further unhelpful in that it undermines the informational transactioncost savings that motivate parties to contract by standard form, despite it
not being the Uber doctrine’s goal to discourage standard form contracting
altogether: “Standard form contracts are in many instances both necessary
and useful.”61
As the foregoing discussion showed, the Uber doctrine’s attempt
to serve the dual purposes of the English and American doctrines of
unconscionability results in a compromise on its scope of application that
leaves it unfit to serve well either purpose.
b. Requirement of unconscientiousness
Whether to include a requirement of unconscientiousness by the defendant
of the unconscionability claim is another aspect in which the Uber
doctrine’s aspiration of fulfilling the functions of both the English and
American doctrines causes it to be ill-suited to do either.
The English doctrine’s requirement of knowledge of the counterpart’s
impairment represents a minimum of wrongfulness by the advantaged
party that, as explained by Peter Birks, is essential to justify the law’s
avoidance of a contract even though the disadvantaged party’s impairment
was less than incapacity.62 The Uber doctrine, by excluding such a
requirement, therefore is not necessarily serving the English doctrine’s
purpose of granting relief from exploitation.63 The Uber doctrine counters
that “a weaker party…is as disadvantaged by inadvertent exploitation
as by deliberate exploitation.”64 However, “inadvertent exploitation”
is an oxymoronic term, and elsewhere the Uber doctrine acknowledges
that it does not require wrongfulness, as it focuses on protection of the
vulnerable.65 Even with no unconscientiousness by the defendant of the
59. See supra note 53.
60. Uber, supra note 22 at paras 89, 91.
61. Ibid at para 88.
62. Peter Birks & Charles Mitchell, “Unjust Enrichment” in Peter Birks, ed, English Private Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
63. Uber, supra note 22 at para 164 (a point made by Brown J at the time).
64. Ibid at para 85.
65. Ibid at paras 84-85. On the broader significance of this novel position with regard to fairness and
justice in contract law, see Moore, supra note 40.
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claim, the doctrine thus relieves unilateral improvidence by the claimant if
the claimant was inadequately able to protect itself.66 Rescinding a contract
relied on by an innocent party, to relieve disadvantage suffered by a party
weak but not incapable, is not consistent with the purpose of the English
doctrine.67 Indeed, without an element of unconscientiousness, arguably the
Uber doctrine’s use of the title “unconscionability” is a misnomer. As well,
one assumes the law would wish in the first place to minimize the number
of “unconscionable” contracts made. In that case, it is counterproductive if
the one remaining party that may well know of the weakness—the weaker
party itself—is incentivized to make such contracts. Arguably, the Uber
doctrine invites weak parties to enter contracts without taking any step to
protect themselves or alert their contractual counterparts of the problem,
because if bargains turns out to be improvident for them, they can get the
bargains rescinded.68
Despite these problems, the Uber doctrine is compelled to omit an
unconscientiousness requirement in pursuit of its simultaneous ambition
of serving the American doctrine’s purpose of controlling unfair standard
form terms. As discussed above, comprising one doctrine seeking to cover
the different scenarios dealt with by the English and American doctrines,
the Uber doctrine relies on classical contract theory to perceive in them
a common problem of the conditions surrounding consent.69 In standard
form contracts, this issue is whether the form-recipient’s consent was not
properly informed. But in that mode of contracting, the drafting party may
have no contact with the form-recipient, and not know if the latter is wellinformed.70 If the doctrine requires knowledge of that, then there would
be a problem. As the Uber doctrine explains, “[a] rigid requirement based
on the stronger party’s state of mind would erode the modern relevance
of the unconscionability doctrine, effectively shielding from its reach
improvident contracts of adhesion where the parties did not interact or
negotiate.”71
Noted earlier was how focusing on whether the form-recipient was
informed, as the Uber doctrine does, itself shields from the doctrine’s reach
offensive standard form terms imposed as part of the process, despite the

66. Ibid at para 66.
67. Ibid at para 166 (part of the objection raised by Brown J at the time).
68. Anthony J Duggan, “Stolen Goods, a Cruise Disaster and a Right of Way Gone Wrong: Three
Unconscionable Contract Cases from a Law and Economics Perspective” (2004) 40:1 Can Bus LJ 3 at
14-17, online: <ssrn.com/abstract=2295717> [perma.cc/GC4V-9Z8L].
69. See text to supra notes 58-60.
70. See text to supra note 41.
71. Uber, supra note 22 at para 85.
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fact, for instance, that their meaning may have been “clearly and effectively
communicated” to the form-receiving party.72 Where on the other hand the
form-recipient was not informed, the omission of a knowledge requirement
facilitates the Uber doctrine’s application. However, this creates a
converse problem: the Uber doctrine invalidates provisions even where a
drafter does what the doctrine would want a drafter to do, but yet the formrecipient remains uninformed. An example would be where the drafter
does what it can to communicate the meaning of the clause, and to verify
that this was understood, but is misled by the form-recipient, who confirms
having been informed when in fact they were not. Such circumstances are
likely quite common, as they are in incorporation cases, where due to red
hand-type rules, drafters sometimes also do what they can be expected to
do to draw attention to harsh or surprising clauses and their implications,
and ask form-recipients to confirm that they are aware, understand, and
accept this before concluding the contract.73 Form-recipients do so, where
required, in order to complete the adhesion contract. That the Uber doctrine
nonetheless applies to such cases is difficult to reconcile with its own
theory of what is unfair in standard form contracting, in that it encourages
form-recipients to conceal that they are uninformed, so that the drafter
will let them conclude the contract; and since that happens commonly, it
becomes futile for drafters to make such efforts to inform recipients.74 In
that regard, the Uber doctrine’s omission of a knowledge requirement is
self-defeating. As well, in these cases too it is inapparent how the drafter
acted unconscientiously such that this should be called “unconscionable”
(all the more so if the drafting party only entered the contract with the
party in question as a result of being deceived).
Thus, the Uber doctrine’s omission of a knowledge requirement does
not make it well-suited to serve the purpose of controlling unfair standard
form terms, as the American doctrine does. The American doctrine omits
such a requirement only because it locates the unfairness of the offensive
term in the fact that drafters know that in standard form contracting, formrecipients lack meaningful choice over the terms, whether or not they
are informed of them. Knowledge is inherent in this understanding of
the unfairness. As noted earlier, the Uber doctrine had to use a different
understanding based on classical contract theory in order to accommodate

72. See supra note 52.
73. See e.g. Karroll v Silver Star Mountain Resorts Ltd (1988), 33 BCLR (2d) 169, 40 BLR 212
(BCSC), McLachlin CJ.
74. Duggan, supra note 68 at 14-17.
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its additional aim of relieving exploitive bargains as the English doctrine
does.
Thus, as shown here, the Uber doctrine’s attempt to serve the dual
purposes of the English and American doctrines of unconscionability
result in it omitting unconscientiousness as a required element, and this
leaves the doctrine unsuited to serve the purpose of either doctrine, or
perhaps altogether of relieving circumstances accurately described as
“unconscionable.”
c. Proportion of contract at stake
The Uber doctrine’s attempt to span the disparate proportions of a contract
at issue under the English and American doctrines is another aspect in
which the Uber doctrine is inapt to fulfil the purpose of either.
Starting with the aim of enabling the setting aside of bargains defectively
formed due to exploitation of a counterpart’s impairment, the focus should
be on the bargain as a whole, as under the English doctrine. For that
purpose, the Uber doctrine’s ability to be used to interrogate the fairness
of selective provisions of the bargain is improper. This was done in Uber
itself, although justified on the basis of construing the arbitration clause
at issue as “a self-contained contract collateral or ancillary to the [main]
agreement.”75 In other cases, the doctrine’s ability to focus on selective
provisions could obscure the existence of compensation elsewhere in a
bargain for the apparent unfairness of provisions selectively targeted.76
And in any case, if the complainant succeeds in establishing the defect in
the contract’s formation that the existence and effect of the doctrine rest
upon, it makes little sense that the complainant can meanwhile have the
court treat the contract as valid but for a bit it dislikes. This undermines
the integrity of the doctrine, making it appear as merely a pretext for
warrantless judicial rewriting of contracts at the invitation of a party who
made a bad bargain.
The ability to train the Uber doctrine on selective provisions, which
causes the problems above with respect to pursuing the purpose of the
English doctrine, results from the Uber doctrine’s ambition of also
covering in a single doctrine the American doctrine’s aim of controlling
unfair terms in standard form contracts. For that purpose, a doctrine must
target individual terms. As the Uber doctrine can do this, is it at least wellsuited to fulfill that purpose?

75. Uber, supra note 22 at para 96.
76. Omri Ben-Shahar, “Regulation Through Boilerplate: An Apologia” (2014) 112:6 Mich L Rev
883 at 895ff, online: <repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol112/iss6/3> [perma.cc/U64C-QYHR].
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It is not. One reason for this is that the Uber doctrine’s term-specific
use is subject to a severability proviso. A severability limitation invites
form-drafters to use their control over the form to shelter unfair terms by
shaping the form in such a way that the potentially unfair terms are not
severable. Even in cases that are not clear-cut, form-drafters are aided by the
strict approach to severance endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada.77
Meanwhile, where unfair terms, for whatever reason, are not severable, the
Uber doctrine avoids the whole transaction. Indeed, even aside from the
question of severability, the court’s “finding of unconscionability can be
directed at [the] contract as a whole.”78 For unfair terms in standard form
contracts, this is generally counterproductive: it leaves the form-recipient
likely needing to accept a similar form from a rival firm, in a modern
economy in which many transaction-types only occur by standard form.79
Otherwise, the party would have to forego the relevant exchange need;
and in fact many exchange needs would fall under this predicament, given
the economy’s pervasive reliance on standard form contracting.80 Turning
to the consequences for the drafting party, the prospect of the whole
contract being avoided creates a separate problem: risk that is extreme
and not easily controlled. Standard forms are developed and utilized for
mass contracting, usually in transaction-types of especial importance
to the drafting firm. The mass avoidance of a form (i.e. through a class
action by recipients of that form) could be catastrophic to the firm. And
that risk is not easily controlled. Fairness is a subjective assessment, and
forms comprise many terms which could trigger the contract’s avoidance
if perceived as unfair. Further, the Uber doctrine’s endorsement of a
lower threshold of unfairness than the marked unfairness required by
the American doctrine81 makes it difficult for drafters to steer clear of a
finding of unfairness. They would have to go to the opposite extreme of
using terms that are unmistakably generous. But since these contracts are
used en masse in transaction-types of especial importance to the firm,
this could do serious damage to the firm’s business interests. Thus, the
unpredictability of whether the whole contract will be avoided, not just the
term, makes the Uber doctrine inapt to incentivize fairer drafting; rather,

77. Shafron v KRG Insurance Brokers (Western) Inc, 2009 SCC 6 at para 32.
78. Uber, supra note 22, n 8.
79. Llewellyn, supra note 14 at 365-366; Friedrich Kessler, “Contracts of Adhesion: Some Thoughts
about Freedom of Contract” (1943) 43:5 Colum L Rev 629, DOI: <10.2307/1117230>.
80. Mindy Chen-Wishart, “Regulating Unfair Terms” in Louise Gullifer & Stefan Vogenauer, eds,
English and European Perspectives on Contract and Commercial Law (Oxford, UK: Hart, 2015) 105
at 110.
81. Uber, supra note 22 at paras 81-82.
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it discourages firms from using standard form contracts at all. Given the
integral role of standard form contracts in the modern economy—and the
tremendous socio-economic progress it has produced82—this aspect of the
Uber doctrine is dangerously regressive, and arguably unfair to all. In cases
where standard form contracts are rescinded as a whole, there may also be
significant collateral economic disruption—beyond the transaction-type at
issue, for example in related classes of contracts involving third parties.
To avoid all this, courts can be expected to apply the doctrine sparingly,
with the consequence that it will not be able to be consistently relied on.
The above problems are rooted again in the Uber doctrine’s attempt to
be two different things in one. The need for a severability condition comes
from the doctrine’s conception using classical contract theory, required in
order to include the English doctrine applicable to bargained contracts,
as discussed earlier. Under classical theory, terms must be consented to;
and if a term is unfair, unless it is severable, invalidating it would alter
the parties’ agreement. Such thinking is misguided in relation to standard
forms, whose terms are unilaterally imposed. Unlike the Uber doctrine,
the American unconscionability doctrine rests on the modern theory that
form terms are not specifically consented to; rather, the form-recipient
provides a conditional “blanket” assent to the incorporation of “any not
unreasonable or indecent terms the [drafter] may have on his form.”83
From that perspective, the unfair term lies outside the conditional blanket
assent and thus was never (an enforceable) part of the contract; it is not
a question of severance.84 As to concern about incompleteness, this is
alleviated as alluded to earlier by the fact that the form terms are seen as
proposing to overlay implied terms reflecting the reasonable expectations
of the parties arising from the terms they did negotiate. So, if a form term
is unenforceable, the implied term could govern the matter at issue.85
In sum, that a finding of unconscionability under the Uber doctrine
can be directed at the whole contract (as in the English doctrine) or at
individual terms (as in the American doctrine) does not fit it for the
dual purposes of those doctrines. It does not provide helpful flexibility;
it creates problematic uncertainty: a specific desired remedy is what
interests a victim of unconscionability in either of these contexts to assert a
claim; and a reasonably ascertainable and preventable risk as the outcome
of a successful claim is what would induce a strong party to modify
82.
83.
84.
85.

John D McCamus, The Law of Contracts, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012) at 185.
Llewellyn, supra note 14 at 370.
ALI, Restatement (Second), supra note 37, § 211(3).
See supra note 44.
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its contractual behaviour in the way the law hopes for in pursuing the
purposes in question. Not knowing what proportion of the contract will be
found to be unconscionable and what the outcome of such a finding will
be again makes it more of a “wildcard” than a doctrine that can be counted
on to serve either of the purposes contemplated.
As the discussion above shows, key features of the Uber doctrine
consist of compromises between the positions of the English and
American doctrines. These compromises were seen as necessary in order
for Canadian law to pursue the purposes of both of those doctrines via a
single “uber”-doctrine. But instead, these compromised features leave the
Uber doctrine unsuited to either purpose.
2. Prospects of refinement?
It may be wondered whether the Uber unconscionability doctrine could be
tweaked so as to be able to suitably fulfill its two intended purposes. This
would seem unlikely. As the preceding discussion explained, the features
that left the Uber doctrine unfit for either purpose were necessitated
precisely by the doctrine’s ambition of pursuing those two differing
purposes via one doctrine.
Relatedly, the discussion revealed how some divergences between the
English and American doctrines that flow from their differing purposes
are fundamental, and hence not easily comingled. For example, to cover
bargained contracts like the English doctrine, a foundation in classical
contract theory is used; yet effective controls of unfair terms in standard
form contracts are based in modern theory, which rejects the classical
perspective. Here, classical theory works to assure there is true mutual
consent to the terms, whereas modern theory accepts that consent to
standard form terms is neither present nor necessary, and works instead
to control abuse of drafters’ unilateral power. As another example, to
pursue their respective purposes while preserving stability of contract
and avoiding large-scale economic disruption, the English and American
doctrines embody opposite approaches: the English doctrine sets aside the
exploitive bargain as a whole, but applies only to exceptional circumstances;
the American doctrine applies to the ubiquitous circumstance of standard
form contracting, but has only a limited effect, invalidating an individual
term while leaving the rest of the contract in force. For a single doctrine
to fulfil both functions, it would have to apply widely, and yet be capable
of invalidating whole transactions. This is clearly unmanageable, at least
without major economic disruption.
Thus, the prospects of refining the Uber doctrine to enable it to achieve
these two aims would seem dim.
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Next, I discuss the alternative of dealing with the two aims separately.
IV. A different approach: separate doctrines tailored to different tasks
1. Established patterns
Avoiding unfair contracts in which a party’s impairment was exploited by
its counterpart, and controlling unfair terms in standard form contracts,
are both important tasks within a system of contract law. And in fact, in
England and America, where a doctrine entitled “unconscionability” serves
one or the other of these functions but not both, separate legal devices exist
to handle the other function.
In England, where unconscionability serves the purpose of providing
relief from unfair bargains made through exploitation of disability, the job
of controlling unfair standard form terms is overseen by legislation. The
Unfair Terms portion of the Consumer Rights Act does this for consumer
contracts, while most other contract-types are subject to standard form
term controls under the Unfair Contract Terms Act.86 It may be added that
this is also the model followed in other common law jurisdictions such as
Australia, New Zealand, and Ireland: unconscionability doctrines set aside
bargains tainted by impairment and exploitation in the bargaining process,
while unfair terms legislation controls offensive standard form contract
terms.87
In America, where control of standard form terms is the function of
its distinct unconscionability doctrine, which is not part of the family of
unconscionability doctrines just mentioned, the task of relieving bargains
made through exploitation of disability is addressed, at a general level,
through the common law precept of constructive (or equitable) fraud.88 In
different scenarios, it is also supported by flexible approaches to various
neighbouring doctrines such as undue influence, economic duress and
mental incompetency.89
Thus, in America and England, exploitation of impaired bargaining
and offensive standard form terms are both problems which are addressed
within the overall system of Contract Law. But in each place, separate
legal devices are used to target these two purposes, rather than trying to
use a single “magic bullet” to hit both, as the Uber doctrine in Canada
86. Consumer Rights Act 2015 (UK); Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (UK).
87. Capper, supra note 13; European Communities (Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts)
Regulations 1995 (Ireland), SI 1995/27; Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Schedule 2
(Australian Consumer Law), ss 23-28; Fair Trading Act 1986 (NZ), 1986/121 ss 26A, 46H-46M.
88. Farnsworth, supra note 14, § 4.27. This type of “fraud” does not refer to deceit, but to
unconscientious advantage-taking: see Aylesford, supra note 7 at 488-491.
89. Farnsworth, supra note 14 at 231, 260, 264-267 (American practice is to treat a higher degree of
substantive unfairness as lowering the threshold of the “procedural” element required for relief).
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attempts to do. Further, as mentioned, other common law jurisdictions like
Australia, New Zealand and Ireland also pursue the two tasks separately.
Outside Canada, where separate legal tools are used to pursue the two
purposes discussed in this article, the presence of common patterns in how
to approach them reinforces the conclusion that their separation enables
tailoring to ensure fitness-for-purpose. For example, despite non-trivial
variation, the unconscionability doctrines in Ireland, Australia and New
Zealand do not depart radically from the English doctrine whose purpose
they share, unlike Canada’s Uber doctrine which does deviate significantly.
Even the American constructive fraud operates similarly to the English
unconscionability doctrine, in dealing with comparable fact situations.
Regarding control of unfair standard form terms, the substantive core of
the legislated regimes in England, Ireland, Australia, and New Zealand
reflects a common basic approach also shared by the judicial doctrine
of unconscionability in America, but not the Uber doctrine in Canada.90
Thus, where the purposes discussed here are each served by dedicated
legal tools, those tools show similar features across different jurisdictions.
They do so in some cases despite the devices having different names, and
even in spite of whether they are of legislative or common law origin. This
pattern reflects the tailoring to purpose explained at the outset.
Might a similar pattern be helpful in Canada?
2. Potential utility in Canada
Unlike England and several other places referenced above, common
law Canada does not have legislative controls of reasonably general
application for unfair terms in standard form contracts.91 However, it
could, like America, use one common law doctrine to deal with that and a
second to deal with unfair bargains made through exploitation of a party’s
disability. Doing so would allow for the tailoring seen in the legal tools
used elsewhere that supports their fitness for the purpose each is devoted
to.
Further, if Canada were to employ separate common law measures
for the two purposes, it could draw on the established doctrines in use
elsewhere in the common law that are tailored to these purposes, to aid
in developing similar devices of its own. Notably, it could use one tool
of the type of the English doctrine of unconscionability (and its relatives
90. In particular, the regimes decline enforcement to a standard form term that is substantively
offensive (even if the form-recipient was informed of the term), while leaving the rest of the contract
in force.
91. There are some specialized controls in certain contexts: for a list of several, see Waddams, Law
of Contracts, supra note 10 at para 545.
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elsewhere) to avoid unfair bargains made by exploiting disability, and a
separate tool of the type of the American doctrine of unconscionability
(whose core model is mirrored in legislated regimes elsewhere) to
control unfair standard form terms. To avoid confusion, these could be
differentiated as “unconscionable bargains” for the doctrine of the type
used in England (where that title is already commonly used) and of
“unconscionable clauses” for the doctrine of the type used in America (a
phrase already associated with that doctrine).92
Using doctrines parallel to those in use elsewhere in the common law
to deal with the same issues would also allow Canadian common law to
take advantage of the extensive bodies of jurisprudence that have grown up
around those doctrines, when dealing with particular scenarios that entail
a similar complexity or difficult judgment call. For control of standard
form contracts, a regime harmonized with that used in the United States
would also be helpful to the economy, in removing trade barriers with
Canada’s main trading partner. The value of such harmonization in the
domain of contract law has been unanimously recognized by the Supreme
Court of Canada.93 With respect to exploitive bargains, harmonization
would further alleviate the risk of trade disruption that exists currently due
to the expansive rather than exceptional scope of the Uber doctrine (which
underlines the danger of experimenting with potentially unsound doctrines
which may have important implications for transnational commerce).
This is by no means to say that Canadian law should not innovate.
But as an innovation, the Uber doctrine is perhaps fundamentally illconceived. Canadian law often finds it fruitful to pursue a middle path,
balancing English and American influences. But for unconscionability,
this is a more radical enterprise, as the English and American doctrines are
not different approaches to a common problem, but doctrines addressed
to different problems, sharing only a common name and a broad concern
with abuse of power. In this area of law, the best that can reasonably be
hoped for is for Canadian courts to devise separate doctrines of the types
of the English and American doctrines for use in addressing each of these
tools’ distinct purpose.
V. Three steps to revitalize unconscionability in Canada
Accepting that contract law in Canada would benefit from using two
separate doctrines, similar to those in use elsewhere in the common law,
suited to each task discussed above, the question which follows is how

92.
93.

It is found, for instance, in the title of UCC, supra note 18, § 2-302.
Bhasin v Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71 at para 41 [Bhasin].
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feasible is this course of action? I submit that it is eminently feasible.
Indeed, there is a wealth of existing precedent in Canada that can be drawn
upon to develop an unconscionable bargains doctrine for avoiding bargains
made through exploitation of a disabled party, and an unconscionable
clauses doctrine for controlling unfair standard form contract terms.
There is also important precedent in Canadian contract law for being
able to accommodate multiple doctrines, tailored to distinct scenarios of
concern, within a larger frame of a single “organizing principle.” This is
the approach of Canadian contract law in another broad area of fairness
concern: good faith. A similar approach could be taken to unconscionability.
I would recommend doing so, in conjunction with the delimitation of
separate doctrines addressed to the different contexts of unconscionability
discussed. This is also my understanding of what Stephen Waddams
means in long advocating for recognition of a “general principle” of
unconscionability—an organizing principle, not an all-purpose doctrine,
as the majority of the SCC in Uber seemed to assume.
In the subsections that follow, I show how feasible this three-part
solution is, and the wealth of precedent that supports it. Addressed first is
the prospect of an organizing principle of unconscionability. Thereafter,
I turn to a doctrine of unconscionable bargains for setting aside bargains
made through exploiting a party who was impaired. I then deal with a
doctrine of unconscionable clauses for controlling unfair standard form
terms.
1. An organizing principle of unconscionability
An overarching “organizing principle” of unconscionability would
help accommodate and rationalize the existence in Canada of separate
subordinate doctrines addressing different specific purposes.
The feasibility of this approach is supported by strong precedent, in
that Canadian contract law does precisely this in another broad area of
fairness concern: good faith. In Bhasin v Hrynew, the SCC was unanimous
in accepting “that there is an organizing principle of good faith that
underlies and manifests itself in various more specific doctrines governing
contractual performance.”94 In that case, the Supreme Court rejected
the approach of having an actual all-purpose duty of good faith95—the
sort of approach that was inadvisedly taken to unconscionability by the
Uber doctrine. In this regard, the vital distinction between an organizing
principle and an actual doctrine was emphasized by the SCC in Bhasin:

94.
95.

Ibid at para 63.
Ibid at paras 37-40, 68-71.
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An organizing principle states in general terms a requirement of justice
from which more specific legal doctrines may be derived. An organizing
principle therefore is not a free-standing rule, but rather a standard that
underpins and is manifested in more specific legal doctrines…in different
situations… Good faith may be invoked in widely varying contexts and
this calls for a highly context-specific understanding.96

In the case of good faith, the organizing principle’s substance was
summarized thus:
The organizing principle of good faith exemplifies the notion that, in
carrying out his or her own performance of the contract, a contracting
party should have appropriate regard to the legitimate contractual
interests of the contracting partner.97

Falling within this broad organizing principle of good faith, the Court
recognized four specific doctrines: the duty of cooperation to achieve the
objects of a contract, the duty to exercise discretionary powers in good
faith, the duty not to evade one’s contractual duties, and the duty of honest
performance.98 Further, the Court left open the possibility of recognizing
additional doctrines in the future:
we should also recognize that this list is not closed. The application of
the organizing principle of good faith to particular situations should be
developed where the existing law is found to be wanting and where the
development may occur incrementally in a way that is consistent with
the structure of the common law of contract and gives due weight to the
importance of private ordering and certainty in commercial affairs.99

Beyond contract law alone, the SCC cited additional precedent on unjust
enrichment further supporting its preference for an approach of contextspecific doctrines tied together by an organizing principle. Regarding
unjust enrichment, the SCC “developed the law through application of
an organizing principle without displacing the existing specific doctrines.
This is what…to do with regards to the organizing principle of good
faith.”100 Doing this would also be helpful in the case of unconscionability.
A clear separation of jurisdiction between the organizing principle of
good faith and an organizing principle of unconscionability can easily be
drawn in that the former pertains to fairness in contractual performance,

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Ibid at paras 64, 69.
Ibid at para 65.
Ibid at paras 47-48, 92.
Ibid at para 66.
Ibid at paras 67-68.
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while the latter would concern the circumstances under which contractual
enforcement is fair.
In taking in Uber the sort of approach unanimously rejected in Bhasin,
of trying to devise a single doctrine which could address unconscionability
in multiple different contexts, the majority cited Stephen Waddams for
approval, paraphrasing Waddams to the effect that:
Although other doctrines can provide relief from specific types of
oppressive contractual terms, unconscionability allows courts to fill in
gaps between the existing “islands of intervention” so that the “clause
that is not quite a penalty clause or not quite an exemption clause or just
outside the provisions of a statutory power to relieve will fall under the
general power, and anomalous distinctions…will disappear.”101

In fact, however, unlike the text inserted by Abella and Rowe JJ in the
paraphrase quoted above, the relevant passage from Waddams says nothing
of a doctrine; it refers to unconscionability as a “general principle.”102
Moreover, this section of Waddams, entitled “A General Principle,”
comes after having already reviewed earlier the specific doctrines
known by the name “unconscionability,”103 among other doctrines that
Waddams sees as exemplifying this general principle, such as the rules on
forfeitures, penalties, restraint of trade, duress, undue influence, and many
others.104 The argument, which he has maintained for half a century,105
is for recognition of an organizing principle of unconscionability, used
by Waddams in a very broad sense “as a synonym for…unfairness” that
calls for relief from the norm of contractual enforcement.106 Waddams
adds that in the event of “open recognition of a general principle of
unconscionability, one would expect the courts to develop guidelines”
governing its application in specific contexts.107 He discussed some such
guidelines in the preceding sections dealing with the various doctrines.
Although he submits that in some cases the formal rules obscure other
factors that in reality track outcomes better in cases that obtained relief,
this only means that more accurate guidelines can be identified. In terms of
general criteria of unconscionability, he also acknowledges that “not every
case lends itself to analysis in terms of equality of exchange and sometimes
it may be that there is a case for relief even when the values exchanged are
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Uber, supra note 22 at para 60.
Waddams, Law of Contracts, supra note 10 at para 549.
Ibid at paras 549, 524, 489.
Ibid, ch 14.
Ibid at para 549; SM Waddams, “Unconscionability in Contracts” (1976) 39:4 MLR 369.
Waddams, Law of Contracts, supra note 10 at para 549.
Ibid at para 552.
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approximately equal.” Likewise, he observes that in some kinds of cases,
inequality of bargaining power is not required.108 Altogether what he is
describing is a very complex picture—far from amenable to the simplistic
approach of a one-size-fits-all doctrine.
Thus, it seems to me that Waddams was not describing such a “magic
bullet” doctrine, but rather an organizing principle of unconscionability—
much like the Supreme Court’s recognition of an organizing principle of
good faith regarding fairness in contractual performance. This distinction
between unconscionability as a doctrine versus as an organizing principle,
as well as understanding Waddams as advocating recognition of a general
organizing principle not a general all-purpose doctrine, were shared by the
concurring opinion in Uber. Brown J concurred in the result—but notably,
strongly disagreed with the majority’s approach to unconscionability, of
trying to “jam” differing functions into a single doctrine:109
some of the uncertainty surrounding unconscionability can be attributed
to varying usage of the term “unconscionable.” Unconscionability, as
an independent doctrine, is “a specific concept, like duress and undue
influence, that provides a basis upon which a transfer may be reversed.”
But unconscionability may also refer, in a more general sense, to a
unifying theme or organizing equitable principle… Some commentators
suggest that unconscionability as a broader principle explains several
independent rules in contract law, including those relating to forfeitures,
penalties, exclusion clauses, duress, and restraint of trade (SM Waddams,
The Law of Contracts…110

The first part of the three-part reconfiguration of the law of unconscionability
in Canada proposed here in order to ameliorate its fitness-for-purpose—
recognizing unconscionability as an organizing principle under which lie
distinct doctrines tailored to different contexts—is therefore supported by
Waddams’ longstanding argument. The majority in Uber were mistaken
in taking it as arguing for a one-stop doctrine. They were under the “false
notion” that unconscionability “is a distinct cause of action…wherever…
conduct…merits the epithet ‘unconscionable.’”111
As far as the scope of the proposed organizing principle of
unconscionability, I would draw it less broadly than Waddams. Many
grounds of relief from contractual enforcement that Waddams includes
within unconscionability are viewed by most authors as outside of it. He
includes under unconscionability even good faith, which would create
108.
109.
110.
111.

Ibid at paras 552, 550.
Uber, supra note 22 at para 152.
Ibid at para 149.
Duggan, supra note 68 at 4.
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unnecessary conflict and duplication with the existing organizing principle
of good faith, distinguished above. I would further confine the organizing
principle of unconscionability to the sorts of scenarios the word suggests:
ones where the concern is an unconscientious abuse of power in the making
of a contract. An organizing principle of unconscionability with that
meaning would encompass, notably, the two different contexts discussed
in this article: setting aside unfair bargains made by exploiting disability,
and control of unfair terms included among the form terms imposed in
standard form contracting.
I now argue the feasibility of Canada having distinct doctrines
dedicated to each of those scenarios, operating beneath the organizing
principle of unconscionability just discussed.
2. A Canadian doctrine of unconscionable bargains
Prior to Uber v Heller, there was not a precedential judgment at the level
of the Supreme Court of Canada on a doctrine of unconscionability of
the English type for setting aside bargains made through exploitation of
a party under a disability.112 The Uber doctrine identified itself as of the
family of doctrines of that type used in common law jurisdictions outside
the US, descended from the English doctrine.113 However, as discussed
earlier, the Uber doctrine also aspires to serve the distinct purpose of the
American doctrine, and thus contains a mélange of features, so that it
differs significantly from doctrines of the English type.
At the level of lower courts, however, a doctrine not only claiming
descent from the English one, but also embodying the general features
of doctrines of that family, has long been present in Canada.114 A widely
recognized leading case for this is Morrison v Coast Finance (BCCA),
which described it as follows:
The equitable principles relating to undue influence and relief against
unconscionable bargains are closely related, but the doctrines are
separate and distinct…a plea that a bargain is unconscionable invokes
relief against an unfair advantage gained by an unconscientious use of
power by a stronger party against a weaker. On such a claim the material
ingredients are proof of inequality in the position of the parties arising
out of the ignorance, need or distress of the weaker, which left him in the
power of the stronger, and proof of substantial unfairness of the bargain
obtained by the stronger. On proof of those circumstances, it creates a
presumption of fraud which the stronger must repel by proving that the
bargain was fair, just and reasonable: Earl of Aylesford v Morris (1873),
112. Uber, supra note 22 at para 157.
113. Uber, supra note 22; e.g. see the body of jurisprudence referenced at para 55.
114. Waters v Donnelly (1884), 9 OR 391, 42 ACWS (3d) 984(ON H Ct J).
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LR 8 Ch 484, per Lord Selborne, LC, at p 491; or perhaps by showing
that no advantage was taken: see Harrison v. Guest (1855), 6 De G M
& G 424 at p 438, 43 ER 1298; affirmed (1860), 8 HLC 481 at pp 4923, 11 ER 517. In Fry v Lane (1888), 40 Ch D 312, Kay, J, accurately
stated the modern scope and application of the principle, and discussed
the earlier authorities upon which it rests. At p 322 he said: The result of
the decisions is that where a purchase is made from a poor and ignorant
man at a considerable undervalue, the vendor having no independent
advice, a Court of Equity will set aside the transaction.115

Another influential statement of the doctrine of the English family long
used in Canada at levels beneath the SCC comes from Cain v Clarica Life
Insurance (ABCA), which after reviewing previous authorities, provided
the following synopsis:
Those authorities discuss four elements which appear to be necessary
for unconscionability. (Some cases state some of the four as exceptions
to be disproved by the alleged oppressor, but nothing turns on onus in
this case.) The four necessary elements are: (1) a grossly unfair and
improvident transaction; and (2) victim’s lack of independent legal
advice or other suitable advice; and (3) overwhelming imbalance in
bargaining power caused by victim’s ignorance of business, illiteracy,
ignorance of the language of the bargain, blindness, deafness, illness,
senility, or similar disability; and (4) other party’s knowingly taking
advantage of this vulnerability.116

The exact contours of this English-type doctrine in Canadian law were
examined in depth again in the 2017 judgment in Downer v Pitcher
(NLCA).117 Within this 50-paragraph discussion, the crux of the doctrine’s
concern was summarized as:
whether there was a degree of vulnerability that had the potential of
materially affecting the ability, through rational autonomous decisionmaking, to protect one’s own interests. If so, a duty will be cast on the
other party not to act or to refrain from acting in such a way that the
resulting transaction is reached in a manner that involves the victim
being unfairly taken advantage of.118

A qualifying vulnerability could stem from “some disabling circumstance
affecting the physical or mental abilities of the claimant” or “from
115. Morrison v Coast Finance Ltd (1965), 55 DLR (2d) 710 at 713, 54 WWR 257 (BCCA).
116. Cain v Clarica Life Insurance, 2005 ABCA 437 at para 32.
117. 2017 NLCA 13 at paras 6-54 [Downer]. See also Rick Bigwood, “Rescuing the Canadian
Unconscionability Doctrine: Reflections on the Court’s Applicable Principles in Downer v Pitcher”
(2017) 60:1 Can Bus LJ 124 [Bigwood, “Canadian Unconscionability”] (Bigwood salutes the
examination of the doctrine in Downer).
118. Downer, supra note 117 at para 37.
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situational circumstances such as severe financial need,” but at all
events is not a general condition; it can be found only by examining “the
circumstances of each case.”119 Regarding the element of advantagetaking, it was explained that “by its nature the jurisdiction [to grant relief]
has to be based on some degree of fault or responsibility on the part of
the person from whom relief is being sought”—hence, the doctrine must
include a requirement of knowledge, whether of the actual vulnerability or
of circumstances as should have been taken as indicating its presence.120
Among the above three formulations, and other versions articulated
by courts in Canada, there are some notable variations. At times, much
has been made of these,121 and also of variations between Canadian
formulations and ones elsewhere, such as in Australia, New Zealand, or
England for instance.122 However, it is vital not to lose sight of the forest
for the trees in the Canadian context, where the term “unconscionability”
is also used in reference to a very different type of doctrine used for a
different purpose, reflecting the coexistent strong influence of the
American doctrine. In the big picture, it is clear that the lower court
authorities above describe an unconscionability doctrine within Canada of
the type of the English doctrine of unconscionable bargains set out earlier
(and its relatives in other common law jurisdictions outside the US). And
this Canadian unconscionable bargains doctrine shares their purpose of
enabling the setting aside of unfair bargains made by exploitation of a
party’s disability.
All that would be needed, then, in order for Canada to have an
unconscionable bargains doctrine of the type of the English doctrine, fit
for the task of avoiding unfair bargains made by exploiting disabilities,
would be for the Supreme Court to recognize this traditional doctrine long
used by lower courts throughout Canada’s common law provinces.
In fact, important steps towards that have already been taken. In
particular, the existence of the traditional doctrine described above was
acknowledged by the SCC in Norberg v Wynrib.123 Norberg was not a
contracts case, much less an unconscionability case; it was a tort case
of battery sexual assault. Justice LaForest—who was renowned for his

119. Ibid at paras 41-42.
120. Ibid at paras 46-47.
121. See e.g. Mitchell McInnes, The Canadian Law of Unjust Enrichment and Restitution (Markham:
LexisNexis Canada, 2014) at 517ff; Bigwood, “Antipodean Reflections,” supra note 7; Bigwood,
“Canadian Unconscionability,” supra note 117; Chris Hunt, “Unconscionability Three Ways:
Unfairness, Consent and Exploitation” (2020) SCLR 37.
122. See e.g. Bigwood, “Antipodean Reflections,” supra note 7; Capper, supra note 13.
123. Norberg v Wynrib, [1992] 2 SCR 226, 92 DLR (4th) 449 [Norberg cited to SCR].
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expertise in private law124—saw unconscionability as providing a “useful
framework” for analyzing the circumstances there of a doctor exploiting a
patient suffering from a prescription drug addiction to obtain sex in return
for drugs: “the common thread is an illegitimate use of power…which
vitiates a person’s freedom of choice.”125 Thus, in Norberg, LaForest J
summarized the traditional doctrine widely used in lower courts, quoting
from Morrison (above) regarding the basis and elements of the doctrine,
and citing Canadian contracts scholars on a similar point as Downer (above)
that the vulnerability required is not established by general conditions but
by the circumstances of each case.126 From England, he further quoted Lord
Denning, that “English law gives relief to one who, without independent
advice, enters into a contract upon terms which are very unfair…when his
bargaining power is grievously impaired by reason of his own needs or
desires, or by his own ignorance or infirmity.”127
In short, the SCC acknowledged in Norberg the existence in Canada
of the traditional English-type doctrine of unconscionability, endorsed
leading Canadian lower court authority as to its features, and tied this to
English law. Largely what remains to be done, then, is simply to carry over
this obiter dicta to a case actually concerning unconscionability. On this, I
add that Rick Bigwood has previously recommended building on Norberg
as the best hope for straightening out a doctrine of unconscionable bargains
in Canada.128
This was likely part of the intent in Uber: the SCC noted there that
“[u]nconscionability is widely accepted in Canadian contract law,” citing
many cases of the traditional English-type doctrine discussed above.129
However, as explained earlier, the majority in Uber was diverted from
this by its ambition to have the doctrine also control standard form terms,
which is not a function fulfilled by the unconscionable bargains doctrines,
but by the distinct American doctrine of unconscionability. The new dualpurpose doctrine the Uber court therefore devised had mixed features that
left it unsuited to either purpose.
124. Beverley McLachlin, “The Evolution of the Law of Private Obligation: The Influence of Justice
La Forest” in Rebecca Johnson et al, eds, Gérard V La Forest at the Supreme Court of Canada, 1985–
1997 (Winnipeg: Canadian Legal History Project, University of Manitoba, Faculty of Law, 2000) 21.
125. Norberg, supra note 123 at 247.
126. Ibid at 247-250.
127. Ibid at 249, quoting Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy, [1974] EWCA Civ 8 [Bundy]. Bundy accepted
the sufficiency for relief of the more “passive” exploitation characteristic of unconscionability,
distinguished from undue influence or duress.
128. Bigwood, “Antipodean Reflections,” supra note 7 at 209; Bigwood, “Canadian
Unconscionability,” supra note 117 at 124.
129. Uber, supra note 22 at para 55.
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Going forward, Uber could—consistent with the suggestion in the
last section—be treated as a discussion about unconscionability as an
organizing principle that fell short at some points to adequately distinguish
the distinct doctrines that should apply to the differing scenarios of bargains
exploiting disability and of offensive standard form terms. Whether or not
that is done, Uber approved of Norberg, which recognized the existence
in Canada of an unconscionable bargains doctrine similar to that used
in England for avoiding contracts made by exploiting a counterpart’s
disability.130 That doctrine is of long pedigree throughout Canada’s
common law provinces, and there is certainly ample precedent to confirm
its authority in relation to the scenarios it addresses.
I now turn to the feasibility of a Canadian unconscionable clause
doctrine for standard form term control.
3. A Canadian doctrine of unconscionable clauses
In this regard too, it seems to me eminently feasible for Canadian contract
law to recognize such a doctrine, and indeed on this also there already
exist important precedents that could be drawn upon.
In particular, the Supreme Court of Canada came close to recognizing
a doctrine of the American type as applicable in Canada in the line of cases
headlined by Hunter Engineering v Syncrude and Tercon Contractors
v British Columbia.131 Tracing back more than 30 years, and including
multiple Supreme Court judgments, this is an essential line of authority.132
Moreover, the statements on unconscionability in Tercon were supported
by a unanimous SCC, and unanimously adopted the earlier comments of
Dickson CJ from Hunter. But due to unresolved confusion about these
cases, the immense benefit it would be for Canadian contract law to draw
on them in recognizing a dedicated tool for controlling unfair terms in
standard form contracts still remains unfulfilled.
The usefulness of these cases as existing precedents supporting
recognition of an unconscionable clauses doctrine applicable in Canada
starts with the observation that there is little in these cases to support
that the “unconscionability” doctrine they were discussing could be
Canada’s English-type unconscionable bargains doctrine, surveyed in

130. Ibid at paras 64-65.
131. Hunter Engineering Co v Syncrude Canada Ltd, [1989] 1 SCR 426, 57 DLR (4th) 321 [Hunter];
Tercon Contractors Ltd v British Columbia (Transportation and Highways), 2010 SCC 4 [Tercon].
132. See e.g. TELUS Communications Inc v Wellman, 2019 SCC 19; Douez v Facebook, 2017 SCC
33; Tercon, supra note 132; ABB Inc v Domtar Inc, 2007 SCC 50 [Domtar]; Guarantee Co of North
America v Gordon Capital Corp, [1999] 3 SCR 423, 178 DLR (4th) 1; Hunter, supra note 132; PlasTex Canada Ltd v Dow Chemical of Canada Limited, 2004 ABCA 309.
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the last section.133 For example, the context—business contracts among
sophisticated enterprises—could hardly be more remote from the situations
that would lead one even to think about unconscionability doctrines of that
type. Moreover, the unconscionability doctrine discussed in these cases
operated to control an offensive term while leaving the rest of the contract
in force, unlike unconscionable bargains doctrines in Canada, England and
elsewhere which operate to rescind whole transactions if their formation
was tainted by impairment and exploitation. Further, if these cases were
discussing the unconscionable bargains doctrine already used throughout
Canada for over a century, there would have been no need to present novel
policy justifications for it, as was done. And those justifications, focusing
on the virtues of dealing overtly with surprising terms, are distant from
unconscionable bargains doctrines’ concern with relieving exploitation of
disabled parties. Nor was there any citation of Morrison—as there was in
Norberg, which was discussing the unconscionable bargains doctrine—
or of other leading cases from the long history of the unconscionable
bargains doctrine in Canada. In short, there is little to suggest the Hunter
and Tercon line of cases could have meant this doctrine when discussing
“unconscionability.”
As this discussion of an unconscionability doctrine in Canada, other
than the traditional unconscionable bargains doctrine, was unprecedented
before Hunter, and thus there were no citations on it to include, a number
of scholars commented that it was unclear what the Supreme Court was
referring to.134 For these reasons, it is impossible to say with certainty what
doctrine of unconscionability the SCC was discussing.
However, the unconscionability doctrine in the Hunter and Tercon
line of cases had to refer to something. Some writers, including Waddams
and John McCamus, noted at the time that these cases seemed to accept
the applicability in Canada of an unconscionability doctrine resembling
that used by American courts.135 Indeed, there are notable similarities in

133. McCamus, supra note 82 at 442-443; SM Waddams, “Unconscionability in Canadian Contract
Law” (1992) 14:3 Loy LA Intl & Comp LJ 541 at 541-543, online: <digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/
vol14/iss3/6/> [perma.cc/LPQ3-6UU7] [Waddams, “Unconscionability”].
134. Robert Flannigan, “Hunter Engineering: The Judicial Regulation of Exculpatory Clauses”
(1990) 69:3 Can B Rev 514 at 514, 529, 536, online: <cbr.cba.org/index.php/cbr/article/view/3477>
[perma.cc/CFC3-VT3V]; Jassmine Girgis, “Tercon Contractors: The Effect of Exclusion Clauses on
the Tendering Process” (2010) 49:2 Can Bus LJ 187 at 208; Shannon O’Byrne, “Assessing Exclusion
Clauses: The Supreme Court of Canada’s Three Issue Framework in Tercon Contractors Ltd v British
Columbia (Transportation and Highways)” (2012) 35:1 Dal LJ 215 at 224, online: <digitalcommons.
schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj/vol35/iss1/8/> [perma.cc/QFG2-U9CV].
135. Waddams, “Unconscionability,” supra note 134 at 541-543; McCamus, supra note 82 at 442443.
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context, operation, and rationales between it and the unconscionability
doctrine commonly used by American courts.
As McCamus noted, in discussing what he labeled a new
“unconscionable term” doctrine employed in these cases, the doctrine’s
operation was novel in Canada in its “recognition of a…capacity of the
courts to strike down unfair or unconscionable terms.”136 As Waddams
explained, “English courts generally do not” do this;137 the English
doctrine and others of that type, including the traditional Canadian
doctrine, “provide a basis for rescission of an agreement” as a whole.138
The “striking out of particular terms” McCamus highlighted, “is a standard
form of relief under American unconscionability doctrine.”139 In fact, the
SCC described the doctrine’s effect as authorizing courts to “refus[e] to
give force to a contractual term”. This too is consistent with the American
doctrine: as Farnsworth explains, “the underlying notion is that a court
may withhold [enforcement]…not that a party may avoid the contract”;
“the remedies…are cast in terms of withholding [enforcement] instead of
avoidance” as in English-type unconscionable bargains doctrines.140
As well, the novel rationales the SCC presented for the doctrine
discussed in these cases, focusing on the merits of overtly controlling
surprising terms, echo those which drove development of the American
doctrine. As discussed earlier, American courts hoped to end dependence
on covert use of processes like interpretation, incorporation, etc. to combat
unfair standard form terms. Similarly, these Canadian cases expressed
an aim of ending reliance on the doctrine of fundamental breach, which
they saw as an “artificial legal doctrine” whose “idiosyncratic traits [are]
sometimes at odds with concerns of fairness.” Indeed, the cases used
some of the same language as the official comment to UCC § 2-302,
which inspired development of the doctrine used in American courts, in
approving of dealing “directly” and “explicitly” with a term’s fairness
“through the doctrine of ‘unconscionability,’” rather than “cloaking the
inquiry” or relying on “games of characterization” or “subterfuge.”141
The contexts seen in this line of cases were also compatible with the
American doctrine. They did not involve the eccentric situations—real
estate transactions with heedless expectant heirs, mortgages with elderly
136. McCamus, supra note 82 at 440-441.
137. Waddams, “Unconscionability,” supra note 134 at 543.
138. McCamus, supra note 82 at 440.
139. Ibid.
140. Farnsworth, supra note 14, § 4.28 at 305-306.
141. Tercon, supra note 132 at paras 108, 127; Hunter, supra note 132 at 462; UCC, supra note 18, §
2-302 Official Comment 1.
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foreign language speakers, etc.—typical of cases of unconscionable
bargains doctrines. Hunter and Tercon, as mentioned, concerned business
contracts among sophisticated enterprises. Moreover, Hunter described the
issue as whether to enforce “a contractual term said to have been agreed,”142
a phrase evoking standard form terms, on which agreement is seen as a
pretence.143 Also in Tercon, the clause at issue was a standard form term.
In another case from this line, ABB v Domtar, the SCC explained that
“[t]his doctrine is generally applied in the context of a consumer contract
or contract of adhesion,”144 much like the American doctrine.
Thus, there are considerable reasons to think that the type of
unconscionability doctrine the SCC had in mind in the Hunter and Tercon
line of cases was the type first used in American rather than English
courts, identifiable despite the lack of an explicit reference by its features,
rationales, and context.
This, as mentioned, was also how some other writers interpreted
it. McCamus, for instance, noted that this Canadian unconscionability
doctrine, like the American doctrine, “may provide a common law device,
long awaited by some, to ameliorate the harsh impact of unfair terms in
boilerplate or adhesion contracts.”145 Waddams, noting the development in
an American law journal, saw it as an American-type “general power…to
set aside contractual provisions on what may broadly be called grounds of
unfairness.”146 He added that “there is much in the Canadian experience
to bear out Llewellyn’s thesis,” echoed by the SCC, on the merits of
developing an unconscionable clauses doctrine to deal overtly with unfair
terms.147 He concluded that “[a]lthough Canadian contract law traditionally
follows English law” these cases point in a different direction.148 Waddams
also considered the doctrine’s American origin no obstacle, as “Canada
shares with the United States the traditions of English common law and
equity.”149
Full recognition of this line of cases as showing the applicability in
Canada of an American-type unconscionable clauses doctrine has been
hindered, however, by some ambiguities. For example, as these cases
simultaneously retired the doctrine of fundamental breach in Canada,
142. Hunter, supra note 132 at 462.
143. Suisse Atlantique v Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale (1966), [1967] 1 AC 361 at 406, [1966] 2 All
ER 61 (HL (Eng)); Radin, supra note 49, chs 2, 5.
144. Domtar, supra note 133 at para 82.
145. McCamus, supra note 82 at 444.
146. Waddams, “Unconscionability,” supra note 134 at 543.
147. Ibid at 541-543. See supra note 142.
148. Waddams, supra note 134 at 543.
149. Ibid at 541.

588 The Dalhousie Law Journal

the discussion at times focused on unfair exclusion clauses, leaving
uncertain whether it also covered other kinds of unfair terms. That said,
Chief Justice Dickson said flat out that “exclusion clauses are not the only
contractual provisions which may lead to unfairness. There appears to be
no sound reason for applying special rules in the case of clauses excluding
liability than for other clauses producing harsh results.”150 In other
cases the discussion of unfair terms was more general, as the rationales
for the doctrine indeed were from the beginning. As Waddams argued
regarding the Court using the term ‘unconscionability,’ “the implication
of this is…that other kinds of unfair clauses may be disallowed if they
are unconscionable.”151 This was later borne out. For instance, in Douez
v Facebook, agreeing with the interpretation of the doctrine as a control
of unfair standard form terms, Abella J applied it to a forum selection
clause.152 And in Telus v Wellman, the SCC unanimously held the doctrine
to be the appropriate device for determining the enforceability of an
allegedly unfair standard form arbitration clause.153 A separate cause of
uncertainty was the lack of a citation to the American doctrine, such as its
leading case, Williams v Walker-Thomas Furniture.154 It may be that the
Court wanted to establish a parallel type of doctrine, without expressly
relying on the American one. Another possibility is that it was not realized
that the unconscionable clauses doctrine commonly used in America was
not already applicable in Canada. In that regard, McCamus explains, “the
justices appear to assume that they are simply applying [an] existing law
of unconscionability.”155 Whatever the explanation, an unconscionability
doctrine with notable similarities to the one long used in America was, in
this line of SCC precedents, shown to be applicable in Canada.
Of note, Uber cited this line of authority as precedent for the claim that
unconscionability could target individual terms.156 Moreover, the unfair
standard form term at issue in Uber was not an exclusion clause but an
arbitration clause. And it was noted that other kinds of clauses (e.g. choice
of law, forum selection), if used unfairly in a standard form, would also
“violate the adhering party’s reasonable expectations” which is “precisely
the kind of situation in which the unconscionability doctrine is meant to

150. Hunter, supra note 142 at 461.
151. SM Waddams, “Abusive or Unconscionable Clauses from a Common Law Perspective” (2010)
49:3 Can Bus LJ 378 at 391.
152. Douez, supra note 132 at paras 112–114.
153. Wellman, supra note 132 at para 85.
154. Williams, supra note 17.
155. McCamus, supra note 82 at 442.
156. Uber, supra note 22, n 8.
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apply.”157 That too parallels the American doctrine, under which persons
who “adhere to standardized agreements” are not bound to standard form
terms “which are beyond the range of reasonable expectation.”158 This all
supports that the Hunter and Tercon line of cases allows for control not
just of exclusion clauses, but of any surprising standard form clause—as
does the American doctrine of unconscionability. However, as discussed,
Uber unhelpfully attempted to develop a new doctrine which could also
fulfill the task of an English-type unconscionable bargains doctrine, thus
mixing features of each, and leaving it unsuited to either.
Mainly what remains to be done, then, is to confirm the existence in
Canada of an unconscionable clauses doctrine of the American type—
separate from the English-type unconscionable bargains doctrine discussed
in the last section—by drawing on the important line of cases discussed
here, headed by Hunter and Tercon.
This would be especially valuable in Canadian contract law, which
presently lacks legislative controls of reasonably general scope over
unfair terms in standard form contracts, as many jurisdictions have.159 A
common law solution—as in the US through the American doctrine of
unconscionability—is what is in reach. Canada would then have separate
doctrines dedicated to the different purposes of unconscionability doctrines
of the English and American types, each fit-for-purpose and based on wellestablished models.
Conclusion
The current state of the law of unconscionability in Canada is lamentable,
as a single uber-doctrine is relied on to pursue two different purposes, but
being thus unfocused, is unsuited to achieve either.
Elsewhere, these purposes are the task of distinct unconscionability
doctrines: unconscionable bargains doctrines, typified by the English
doctrine of unconscionability, fulfill the function of enabling avoidance
of unfair bargains made through exploitation of a party’s disability;
meanwhile, unconscionable clauses doctrines, typified by the American
doctrine of unconscionability (and embedded in the substance of legislated
regimes elsewhere), serve the purpose of controlling unfair terms in
standard form contracts. Each of these doctrinal types has features tailored
to the distinct scenario it addresses, so that both are fit-for-purpose.
Canadian contract law, needing legal devices to address these important
purposes also, and influenced by both the English and American doctrines
157. Ibid at para 89.
158. ALI, Restatement (Second), supra note 37, § 211(3) cmt f.
159. See supra note 91.
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of unconscionability, should develop separate doctrines of each of these
types for use for their respective purposes, rather than continue down the
dead-end path of trying to mix features of them into a single magic bullet
doctrine of unconscionability that is expected to do everything.
Specifically, this article proposed a three-part plan that is readily
feasible and indeed builds on a wealth of existing precedent in Canadian
contract law: (1) The traditional English-type unconscionable bargains
doctrine long used by Canadian lower courts and acknowledged by the
SCC in Norberg and Uber should be recognized as governing situations
in which a party seeks rescission of a contract because of suffering from
a special disability that was taken advantage of by its counterpart in the
bargaining process; (2) The distinct unconscionability doctrine discussed
in the Hunter and Tercon line of SCC cases should, due to its similarities
to the American doctrine and the critical need for a dedicated and fit-forpurpose Canadian control of unfair standard form terms, be recognized as
an unconscionable clauses doctrine of that type; (3) To rationalize the law
of unconscionability more broadly, including explaining the relationship
between the two doctrines just discussed, unconscionability should like
good faith (and as a correction to Uber’s understanding of what Stephen
Waddams was recommending) be recognized as an “organizing principle”
in Canadian contract law, allowing possible relief from enforcement in
case of unconscientious abuse of power—subject to conditions set by
subordinate doctrines like those just mentioned, each of which address
specific contexts.
These steps would assure the fitness-for-purpose of unconscionability
in Canada, drawing on established doctrines long in use, and producing
harmonization to alleviate barriers to cross-border trade. Meanwhile, the
doctrines would be organized within a clear and rational framework that is
distinctively Canadian.

